

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 13, 2001

**TO:** K. Fortenberry, Technical Director

**FROM:** D. Grover and M. Sautman, Hanford Site Representatives

**SUBJ:** Activity Report for the Week Ending July 13, 2001

Tank Farms: A recent tank transfer event had several serious conduct of operations problems. First, it was eventually discovered that the reason why the transfer repeatedly could not be initiated was that a valve was in the “closed” rather than the “open” position. This misalignment occurred even though the valve was clearly labeled and both the operator performing the lineup and the independent verifier signed the line-up sheet that it was “open.” In addition, while troubleshooting the transfer problem, workers on graveyard shift switched pump motor control leads without a routine work request (RWR) and this was not caught by the senior supervisory watch. The field work supervisor (FWS) prepared the RWR *after* the work was completed. All of the signatures on the RWR were the FWS’s, who has multiple qualifications. There are also reports that multiple revisions to the transfer procedure were not handled appropriately or that operators may have initialed the procedure for other workers. Many of these issues were discovered by Department of Energy (DOE) personnel. CH2M Hill Hanford Group has initiated an Independent Investigation of Conduct of Operations Issues. (I-C)

Plutonium Finishing Plant: The PFP Director is proposing several fire protection Technical Safety Requirements modifications for the 2736-ZB Building after a review this week by Messrs. Bamdad, Coones, and Sautman identified several deficiencies with their content and implementation. The original Required Actions for an inoperable fire sprinkler and/or fire detection and alarm systems allowed activities with likely ignition sources to continue for 72 hours and did not terminate other activities for 45 days. The proposal is to terminate all activities within 8 hours for an inoperable fire sprinkler system and institute fire surveillances within 8 hours for an inoperable fire detection and alarm system. In addition, a fire protection engineer will now be required to walkdown rooms weekly to ensure that combustible loads are within those analyzed in the fire hazards analysis after a staff walkdown found problems with how the current administrative controls were being implemented. Finally, the TSR Surveillance Requirements will be made more comprehensive in response to staff observations. (I-C)

Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP): During the month of June, the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) experienced a number of operational occurrences. The facility’s actions to evaluate the safety significance of some of these events raise questions regarding the facility and project management’s knowledge of the occurrence reporting order requirements and guidelines, the facility confinement system, and the authorization basis. Mr. Grover is continuing to discuss with Fluor Hanford and Department of Energy management the safety significance of recent events and management’s response to them. (I-C)

cc: Board Members